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 All the theory that fits! Home This is Lawrence Solum's legal theory weblog. Legal Theory Blog comments and reports on recent scholarship in jurisprudence, law and philosophy, law and economic theory, and theoretical work in substantive areas, such as constitutional law, cyberlaw, procedure, criminal law, intellectual property, torts, contracts, etc. RSS Links for Legal Theory Blog --Lawrence B. 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Solum University of Illinois College of Law 504 East Pennsylvania Ave Champaign, IL 61820 USA 
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Sunday, October 31, 2004
Legal Theory Calendar--Updated
Oxford Seminar on Moral Philosophy: Michael Zimmerman (North Carolina at Greensboro), 'Is moral obligation objective or subjective?' NYU Law: Albert Yoon (Visiting from Northwestern). The End of the Rainbow: Understanding Turnover among Federal Judges. Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies: Ambreena Manjim Socio-Legal Approaches to Law and Development: The Rebirth of Law and Development: A Feminist Critique. Oxford Faculty of Law: Michele Graziadei, 2004 Clarendon Lectures : On playing tennis with the net up: fiduciary obligations, contractual relations and property. UCLA School of Law: David Callahan, Founder, Demos Public Policy Center, “The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead”.
University of Chicago Law & Economics: Alex Stein, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, Overenforcement. Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre: Andreas Panagopoulos, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: The Effects of Firm Size in Reaching an Out-of-court Settlement.
Oxford Centre for Criminology: Pat O’Malley, The Uncertain Promise of Risk.
Boston University, School of Law: Ward Farnsworth, "Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court's Criminal Docket". Florida State University, School of Law: Kathyrn Zeiler, Georgetown University Law Center, "Common Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-theories." Loyola Marymount, Loyola Law School: Sharon Dolovich, Professor of Law, UCLA Law School, “Punishment and Profit: The Case Against Private Prisons”. Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Salem Chalabi, Prosecuting Saddam Hussein: The Iraqi Special Tribunal for War Crimes. University of Michigan Law & Economics: Daryl Levinson, New York, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law.
UCLA School of Law: Kathleen Clark, Washington University School of Law, "The Meaning of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law". University of Texas, School of Law: Richard Markovits, "Predatory Investments," "Predatory Systems Rivalry and Predatory Aftermarket Conduct". Legal Theory Lexicon: Public Reason
Historical Perspective Where does the idea of public reason come from? Contemporary scholarship sometimes assumes that the notion of public reason was invented out of whole cloth by Rawls, but in fact, it has a long philosophical history. For example, the phrase "public reason" is found in Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan. The section of Leviathan in which this passage appears addresses the question, whose reason should govern the question of whether a purported miracle has occurred?
A second use of the phrase "public reason" is found in Rousseau's Discourse on Political Economy:
Another early use of the phrase "public reason" is found in Thomas Jefferson's Second Inaugural Address:
In What is Enlightenment, Kant introduces the idea of public reason as an answer to a question that might be phrased, "What restrictions on freedom of public discourse will facilitate public enlightenment?" Kant replies:
Here is the point of the history: the idea of public reason is contested, with different theorists offering different conceptions public reason. I am about to give you Rawls's ideas about public reason, but it is very important to realize that Rawls's theory is just one of many, and that new theories of public reason are likely to emerge in the years ahead. Rawls and Public Reason In an early formulation, Rawls explained what he has called the "idea of free public reason":
Second, the limits imposed by Rawls' ideal of public reason do not apply to all actions by the state or even to all coercive uses of state power. Rather, his ideal is limited to what he calls "the constitutional essentials" and "questions of basic justice." Thus, the scope of the freedom of speech and qualifications for the franchise would be subject to the Rawlsian ideal, but the details of tax legislation and the regulation of pollution control would not. Third, Rawls' ideal of public reason applies to citizens and public officials when they engage in political advocacy in a public forum; it also governs the decisions that officials make and the votes that citizens cast in elections. The ideal does not apply to personal reflection and deliberation about political questions; by implication it could not apply to such reflection or deliberation about questions that are not political in nature. Public Reason and Law How is the idea of public reason relevant to legal theory? One answer to this question might begin with Rawls's observation that judicial reasoning, for example the reasoning of the Supreme Court, exemplifies public reason. It would be unusual to see a Supreme Court justice rely on a particular religion or on a deep philosophical view about the meaning of life or the ultimate nature of the good. There are exceptions, however. One of the most infamous Supreme Court opinions in the contemporary period is Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, the case that was recently overruled in Lawrence v. Texas. Burger argued that criminalization of homosexual conduct was constitutionally permissible, because the prohibition on such conduct was rooted in Judeo-Christian morality. Arguably this argument exceeded the bounds of public reason, because the United States is a pluralist society in which there are many citizens outside of the Judeo-Christian tradition, including, for example, Buddhists, adherents of Native American religions, and nonbelievers. One of the interesting features of the idea of public reason is that it provides an argument against what we might call going deep in legal theory. By going deep, I mean making arguments that rely on deep philosophical premises, about ultimate values on the one hand or metaethics and moral psychology on the other. So, for example, it might be argued that utilitarianism (or welfare economics) is an inappropriate source of legal arguments, when the argument relies on a deep utilitarian premises, such as the notion that only utility (e.g. hedonic value or preference satisfaction) is valuable. That premise, it might be argued, goes beyond public reason. The idea of public reason is deeply controversial and the subject of heated debate, but the connections between public reason and law have only recently begun to be explored in depth. Saturday, October 30, 2004
Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends A Dictionary of Legal Theory by Brian Bix. I've just been browsing through Bix's marvelous volume--a real treat! Here's a brief description:
Download of the Week The Download of the Week is The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century by Brian Leiter. Here is a taste from his blog post on the paper:
Friday, October 29, 2004
Friday Calendar
UCLA School of Law: Lynn Baker, University of Texas Law School of Law, "Lochner's Lessons for Modern Federalism" University of Texas, School of Law: Richard Markovits, "Predatory Investments" & "Predatory Systems Rivalry and Predatory Aftermarket Conduct" Conference Announcement: 28th International Wittgenstein Symposium
Jacob on Aristotle on Justice as a Virtue Bernard E. Jacob (Hofstra University - School of Law) has posted Aristotle and the Graces:
Thursday, October 28, 2004
Dougherty on First Amendment Defenses to the Rights of Publicity Claims F. Jay Dougherty (Loyola Marymount) has posted All the World's Not a Stooge: The 'Transformativeness' Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art (Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2003) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Solove on the Digital Person Daniel J. Solove (George Washington University Law School) has posted The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (Daniel Solove, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION Age, NYU Press, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
LoPucki on the Death of Liability Lynn M. LoPucki (University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law) has posted The Death of Liability (Yale Law Journal, October 1996) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Post on Naturalism and Normativity John Post has uploaded Naturalism, Reduction and Normativity: Pressing from Below:
Thursday Calendar
Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law School: Vikram Amar, Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, “The Cheney Case and the Unresolved Lingering Questions About Executive Privilege and the Odd Office of the Vice Presidency” Florida State University, School of Law: Robin Craig, University of Indiana-Indianapolis, "The Stevens-Scalia Principle: Statutory Conversations and the Strict Plain Meaning Approach." UCLA Legal Theory: Heather K. Gerken, Harvard, "Second-Order Dissent" Hofstra School of Law: Edward Stein, Cardozo Law School, "Past and Present Proposed Amendements to the Constitution Regarding Marriage." Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Professor Malcolm Evans OBE, Recent Approaches to Torture in English Law. Stanford Law & Economics: Mark Geistfeld (New York University Law School) “Economic Analysis in a Rights-Based Conception of Tort Law” University of Michigan Law & Economics: Mitu Gulati, Georgetown, What Drives Changes in Boilerplate Contracts Saint Louis University, School of Law: Stacey Dogan, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli? Wednesday, October 27, 2004
Wednesday Calendar
NYU Legal History: Ed Purcell, New York Law School. New from Law & Politics Book Review
RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES, by John Phillip Reid. DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004. 160pp. Cloth $32.00. ISBN: 0-87580-327-X. Reviewed by Craig Hanyan. THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS, 2ND EDITION: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE, by Stuart Scheingold (Foreword by Malcolm Feeley). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. 280pp. Cloth $22.95. ISBN: 0-472-03005-1. Reviewed by Jeffrey R. Dudas. THE UNITY OF PUBLIC LAW, by David Dyzenhaus (ed). Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004. 520pp. Hardback. £45.00 / $90.00. ISBN: 1-84113-434-1. Reviewed by Upendra Baxi. THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES, by Stanley S. Herr, Lawrence O. Gostin, and Harold Hongju Koh (eds). New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 578pp. Paperback. $49.95 / £35.00. ISBN: 0199264511. Hardback. $175.00 / £100.00. ISBN: 0198267797. Reviewed by Dr Susan C. Breau. AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT SEX OFFENDING, by Franklin E. Zimring. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. 216pp. Cloth. $29.00. ISBN: 0-226-98357-9. Reviewed by Mark Chaffin. Tuesday, October 26, 2004
Boettke on Hayek & Market Socialism Check out Hayek and Market Socialism: Science, Ideology, and Public Policy by Peter J. Boettke over at mises.org. Leiter on Dworkin Brian Leiter's keynote address (from the inaugural conference of the Rutgers Institute for Law and Philosophy last May) is finally available at SSRN. You must read this--even if you disagree with Leiter! The title is The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century. Here is a taste from his blog post on the paper:
Gilreath on the Technicolor Constitution Shannon D. Gilreath (Wake Forest University - School of Law) has posted The Technicolor Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism, Ethical Norms, and Legal Pedagogy (Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights, Vol. 9, No. 22, 2003) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Tuesday Calendar
Lewis & Clark School of Law: Jennifer Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration. Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre: Dev Gangjee, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: The Name Blame Game (or Why are Geographical Indications so Controversial?)” Monday, October 25, 2004
Weekend Update On Saturday, the Download of the Week was Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty. A Kantian Argument by Carla Bagnoli and the Legal Theory Bookworm recommended Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence by Peter Railton. Sunday's Legal Theory Lexicon entry was on Utilitarianism. And the Legal Theory Calendar previews this weeks talks and conferences. Monday Calendar
At Stanford's Center for Internet and Socienty (CIS), Eugene Volok presents Crime-Facilitating Speech. Columbia Law & Economics: Professor Jennifer Arlen, New York University, School of Law, "Contracting Over Malpractice Liability". Hofstra, School of Law: Jennifer Gordon, Fordham Law School, “The Best Labor Law in America: The United Farm Workers, the Agricultural Labor Relations Act, and Reflections on the Reform of the NLRA.” Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar: Robert Audi, Notre Dame. New York University, School of Law: Mark Tushnet (Visiting from Georgetown), Our Perfect Constitution. UCLA School of Law: Sam Thompson, UCLA School of Law, "How Will the Tax Policies of Bush & Kerry Affect Economic Growth?" Conference Announcement: Moral Particularism at Canterbury
Epstein versus Levinson Over at Legal Affairs, Richard Epstein & Sandy Levinson debate Should Colorado split its electoral votes?. Sunday, October 24, 2004
Legal Theory Calendar
At Stanford's Center for Internet and Socienty (CIS), Eugene Volok presents Crime-Facilitating Speech. Columbia Law & Economics: Professor Jennifer Arlen, New York University, School of Law, "Contracting Over Malpractice Liability". Hofstra, School of Law: Jennifer Gordon, Fordham Law School, “The Best Labor Law in America: The United Farm Workers, the Agricultural Labor Relations Act, and Reflections on the Reform of the NLRA.” Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar: Robert Audi, Notre Dame. New York University, School of Law: Mark Tushnet (Visiting from Georgetown), Our Perfect Constitution. UCLA School of Law: Sam Thompson, UCLA School of Law, "How Will the Tax Policies of Bush & Kerry Affect Economic Growth?"
Lewis & Clark School of Law: Jennifer Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration. Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre: Dev Gangjee, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: The Name Blame Game (or Why are Geographical Indications so Controversial?)”
NYU Legal History: Ed Purcell, New York Law School.
Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law School: Vikram Amar, Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, “The Cheney Case and the Unresolved Lingering Questions About Executive Privilege and the Odd Office of the Vice Presidency” Florida State University, School of Law: Robin Craig, University of Indiana-Indianapolis, "The Stevens-Scalia Principle: Statutory Conversations and the Strict Plain Meaning Approach." UCLA Legal Theory: Heather K. Gerken, Harvard, "Second-Order Dissent" Hofstra School of Law: Edward Stein, Cardozo Law School, "Past and Present Proposed Amendements to the Constitution Regarding Marriage." Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Professor Malcolm Evans OBE, Recent Approaches to Torture in English Law. Stanford Law & Economics: Mark Geistfeld (New York University Law School) “Economic Analysis in a Rights-Based Conception of Tort Law” University of Michigan Law & Economics: Mitu Gulati, Georgetown, What Drives Changes in Boilerplate Contracts Saint Louis University, School of Law: Stacey Dogan, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?
UCLA School of Law: Lynn Baker, University of Texas Law School of Law, "Lochner's Lessons for Modern Federalism" University of Texas, School of Law: Richard Markovits, "Predatory Investments" & "Predatory Systems Rivalry and Predatory Aftermarket Conduct" Legal Theory Lexicon: Utilitarianism
What is “utilitarianism”? Just about every law student has some basic familiarity with the idea of utilitarianism, but unless you were a philosophy or economics major, you may have only a fuzzy notion of what this term really means. In this history of moral philosophy, utilitarianism is strongly associated with two historical figures, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Mill’s views are important and deeply interesting, but they are also extremely difficult to sort out properly. Jeremy Bentham, however, provides a wonderful entrée into the world of utilitarian moral and political philosophy. Law students should be especially fond of Bentham, because with only a bit of exaggeration, we can say than Bentham is the original disgruntled law student. Bentham, you see, was highly displeased with William Blackstone’s lectures on law at Oxford University. The common law, Bentham thought, was a disorganized body of rules. Common-law judges irrationally worshipped historical pedigree and had an immoral disregard of the consequences of legal rules. Legal rules, Bentham believed, should be codified, and the codes should be written so as to produce “the Greatest Good, for the Greatest Number.” That is, we should adopt those legal rules that will maximize utility. Consequentialism Utilitarianism is just one member of a more general family of moral theories, which we might call “consequentialist.” Consequentialism is the view that morality is about consequences of decisions. Utilitarianism is a particular form of consequentialism, but not the only form. Consequentialism is sometimes contrasted to deontology, where deontological moral and political theories maintain that there are moral rules or principles, the violation of which cannot be justified on the ground that good consequences would result. Thus, a consequentialist might believe that one may tell lies, break promises, or injure innocent persons in order to accomplish a greater good, whereas a deontologist might believe that such actions are forbidden--even if good consequences will result. Disambiguating Utilitarianism Let’s pause for a moment. It turns out that “utilitarianism,” the term, refers to many different interrelated theories. “Utilitarianism” is ambiguous, and so we need to specify what we mean by utilitarianism by answering some questions:
Eudaimonistic Utilitarianism. But is the good really just a matter of pleasures and pains? Many of Bentham’s critics argued that not all pleasures are good. Would you really want to live your life carrying around a device that constantly stimulated the pleasure center of your brain and suppressed the pain center? Rather than maximize pleasure, we might instead maximize “happiness”—eudaimonia in ancient Greek. Happiness may be related to pleasure, but it includes more abstract satisfactions. Climbing a mountain may involve much more pain than pleasure, but this activity may still contribute to the happiness of the climber. Preference Satisfaction Utilitarianism. But if happiness seems a better candidate for “good” than pleasure, there are difficulties with the proposition that the law should maximize “happiness.” Happiness is notoriously difficult to define, and different persons have different views about what makes for a happy life. Moreover, happiness, like pleasure, is difficult to measure directly. For these reasons and others, some utilitarian theorists (especially economists) substitute “preference” for happiness as the “good” to be maximized. Preferences can be measured in a variety of ways. For example, we can ask individuals to simply rank order their preferences among various states of affairs, giving us an ordinal utility function for the individual. Economists have devised a variety of techniques for translating these rank orderings (1st best, 2nd best, etc.) into numerical values. Thus, we can construct a cardinal utility function for an individual. Because preference-satisfaction is measurable, most economists use a preference-based conception of utility. And because of the influence of economics on legal theory, this form of utilitarianism has had the greatest impact on contemporary legal theory as well. Scope of Decision So let’s assume we have a working conception of utility. Our next question is: What exactly is the decision that is supposed to maximize utility? Is each individual action required to maximize utility? Or is it general rules that we are concerned with? Or principles? Or something else? I am going to call this question, the scope of decision question. Different forms of utilitarianism give different answers to the scope of decision question. Let’s take a quick look at some of the possibilities:
Action B has a 90% chance of producing a utility of 0, and a 10% chance of producing a utility of 100. Since .9*0 +.1*100 = 10, the expected utility of action A is 10. And since 10 > 5, action A has the greater expected utility. Of course, it may turn out that action B produces a utility of zero, but if what counts is expected utility, then this ex post fact is irrelevant to the moral evaluation of action A.
The Self-Defeating Objection Another objection is that utilitarianism may be self-defeating. Suppose that everyone tried to deliberate as a utilitarian. It might turn out that nonetheless they would make decisions that led to bad consequences. For example, some people may be extremely bad at predicting the consequences of their actions. Others may systematically overestimate their own utilities while systematically underestimating those of others. One answer to this objection is famously associated with the British moral philosopher R.M. Hare. Hare proposed a two-level theory of morality. Utilitarianism, Hare argued, operates at the level of detached moral theorizing. Ultimately, an action is deemed good or bad based on its utility. But ordinary moral deliberation, Hare continued, operates at a different level. Ordinary folks should deliberate on the basis of moral rules of thumb, such as keep your promises, don’t steal, and don’t enslave your enemies when you vanquish them. As you might guess, there are many criticisms of two-level theories, but you get the general idea. The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons This one gets very complicated, very fast. So let me just state the general idea. Suppose we are trying to add up individual utilities for everyone in society. How do we come up with values that are truly comparable across persons. That is, how do we know that X amount of my pleasure or happiness or preference satisfaction is equal to Y amount of yours? This problem is especially vexing for economists, and one solution is simply to limit the conclusions of economics to cases that involve making everyone better off—hence obviating the need for interpersonal comparisons. The Demandingness Objections The list of objections goes on and on, but let’s do just one more. It is frequently argued that utilitarianism (especially act utilitarianism) is too demanding. Why? Imagine that it is your day off. You have two choices. You can either read a novel or your can work for Oxfam. If you read a novel, you will produce some positive utility—your enjoyment of the novel. But if you worked for Oxfam, you would save 1.7 starving children in the third world from death. Well, of course, you should work for Oxfam. But the problem is that it will always be the case that I could produce more utility for others if I dedicated my time to helping the least fortunate. Utilitarianism seems to require me to work for Oxfam after work and to stay up as late as I possibly can. In fact, I may be able to maximize utility by neglecting my health and family. If this is true, many would find utilitarianism too demanding and hence implausible.
--Normative law and economics usually assumes that the system of legal rules (as opposed to individual actions or ideal moral rules) provide the relevant scope of decision. --Normative law and economics usually assumes that utilities are to be summed—although this issue is rarely addressed in any detail. --Normative law and economics usually assumes that it is expected utilities, rather than actual utilities, that are to be maximized. Links Saturday, October 23, 2004
Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence by Peter Railton. Here a blurb:
Download of the Week The Download of the Week is Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty. A Kantian Argument by Carla Bagnoli. Here is a taste:
Friday, October 22, 2004
Bibas on Fisher on Plea Bargaining Stephanos Bibas (University of Iowa - College of Law) has posted Pleas' Progress (Michigan Law Review, Vol. 102, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the Abstract:
Yeazell on Brown & the Silent Litigation Revolution Stephen C. Yeazell (University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law) has posted Brown, The Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution (Vanderbilt Law Review, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Hasen Replies Richard L. Hasen (Loyola Marymount) has posted The Supreme Court and Election Law: A Reply to Three Commentators (Journal of Legislation, Vol. 31, January 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Burke on the Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act Marcilynn A Burke (University of Houston - Law Center) has posted Klamath Farmers and Cappuccino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and Why it (Still) Matters (Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Vol. 14, p. 441, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Book Announcement
Mikos on Congress's Shadow & Enforcement of State Law Robert A. Mikos (University of California, Davis - School of Law) has posted Enforcing State Law in Congress's Shadow on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The Role of Folk Psychology Joshua Knobe (Princeton) has posted The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology:
Friday Calendar
UCLA, School of Law: Julie Greenberg, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, "You Can't Take It with You: Gender Identity Across State Lines" Thursday, October 21, 2004
Event Announcement: Volokh at Stanford
Thursday Calendar
Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Chris Sidoti, The Implementation of International Human Rights Standards. Oxford Financial Law Discussion Group: Colin Mayer, The Evolution of Law and Finance in Germany and the UK. Welcome to the Blogosphere . . . . . . to Political Arguments, a blog that focuses on political theory. Alfredo Perez writes:
Call for Papers: The First Decade of Cyberspace Law
Conference Announcement: Corporate Misbehavior & Social Psychology
Wednesday, October 20, 2004
Wednesday Calendar
Oxford Centre for Criminology: Kathleen Daly, Restorative Justice and Sexual Assault. NYU Legal History: Maribel Morey, NYU Law School. Tuesday, October 19, 2004
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Game Theory and Ethics Be sure to check out Game Theory and Ethics, a new entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Bruno Verbeek and Christopher Morris. Here is a taste:
Bagnoli on Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty Carla Bagnoli has uploaded Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty. A Kantian Argument (Nomos, forthcoming). Here is a taste:
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